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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-STATE WATER
DISTRICT VOTING SYSTEM BASED ON ONE ACRE-ONE VOTE
DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE DESPITE DIS-
TRICT'S EXTENSIVE ELECTRIC UTILITY OPERATIONS. Ball v.
James, 101 S. Ct. 1811 (1981).
In Ball v. James,' a divided2 United States Supreme Court held
that a water district's' system for election of board members, permit-
ting one vote for each acre of land owned within the district,4 did not
violate the one person-one vote principle5 of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment6 when the district's purpose was
sufficiently specialized and the district's activities disproportionately
affected landowners. While a similar exception to the principle of
one person-one vote was previously announced in Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,' Ball significantly ex-
pands the scope of the Salyer exception to include a special govern-
mental district that subsidizes its expenses by selling electricity to
several hundred thousand people, including disenfranchised non-
landowners and residents of a large metropolitan area.
The district in question in Ball was the Salt River Project Agri-
cultural Improvement and Power District,8 located in central Ari-
zona. The Salt River Project is a governmental entity9 that controls
1. 101 S. Ct. 1811 (1981).
2. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Powell also filed a brief concurring opin-
ion. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Mar-
shall joined.
3. Water districts authorized by law fall under the general topic of special district gov-
ernments. The best known general work on the subject of special districts is J. BOLLENS, SPE-
CIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1957). See also Makielski, The Special
District Problem in Virginia, 55 VA. L. REV. 1182 (1969); Minge, Special Districts and the Level
of Public Expenditures, 53 J. URB. L. 701 (1976); Rafalko, Overlapping Districts Versus Munici-
pal Authorities in the Area of Urban Redevelopment, 3 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 24 (1966).
4. See notes 24 and 25 infra.
5. See note 36 infra,
6. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. 410 U S. 719 (1973).
8. For a thorough examination of the Salt River District, see Comment, Voter Restric-
tions in Special Districts. A Case Study of the Salt River Project, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 636.
9. Agricultural improvement districts are empowered by the Arizona Constitution.
Irrigation, power, electrical, agricultural improvement, drainage, and flood con-
trol districts, and tax levying public improvement districts, now or hereafter organ-
ized pursuant to law, shall be political subdivisions of the State, and vested with all
the rights, privileges and benefits, and entitled to the immunities and exemptions
the conservation, storage, and delivery of untreated water to the
owners of 236,000 acres of land."° The control of water allocation
within its service area" enables the district to influence flood control
and environmental management within its boundaries.' 2 Forty per-
cent of the water delivered by the district is used for non-agricultural
purposes.' 3 Salt River Project property is not subject to state or local
property taxation.' 4  The district may condemn land,'5 sell tax-ex-
empt bonds,' 6 enter into contractual agreements to secure energy
sources,' 7 and raise money through an acreage-proportionate taxing
power assessable on lands within the district.' Although outstand-
ing bonds are secured with liens on the lands of voting members of
the district, 19 the district is authorized to generate and sell hydroelec-
tric power2" and thereby subsidizes the majority of its operations and
capital improvements2 by selling electricity to several hundred
granted municipalities and political subdivisions under this Constitution or any law
of the State or of the United States ....
ARIZ. CONST. art. 13, § 7. The relevant Arizona statute elaborates,
An agricultural improvement district organized under the provisions of this
chapter is a public, political, taxing subdivision of the state, and a municipal corpora-
tion to the extent of the powers and privileges conferred by this chapter or granted
generally to municipal corporations by the constitution and statutes of the state, in-
cluding immunity of its property and bonds from taxation.
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-902 (1956).
10. The parties stipulated to these facts. 101 S. Ct. at 1814 n.l.
11. An Arizona statute gives the district firm control over water allocation.
No right to the use of water on or from any watershed or drainage area which
supplies or contributes water for the irrigation of lands within an . . .agricultural
improvement district. . . shall be severed or transferred without the consent of the
governing body of such. . . agricultural improvement district ....
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172(5) (Supp. 1981).
12. 101 S. Ct. at 1815.
13. Approximately 15% of the water is used in farming areas for non-agricultural pur-
poses such as schools, playgrounds, and parks. Another 25% is delivered to municipalities. Id
at 1818 n.9.
14. See note 9 supra.
15. The board of directors of the district is authorized to exercise the right of eminent
domain through condemnation proceedings regulated by Arizona law. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-939 (1956).
16. See note 9 supra
17. The district is granted authority to develop a broad spectrum of energy sources.
For the purpose of acquiring or assuring a supply of electric power and energy to
serve the district's customers, the board, for the and in the name of the district may,
without the boundaries of the state, acquire, develop, own, lease, purchase, construct,
operate, equip, maintain, repair and replace, and contract for. . . any form of energy
or energy resources including but not limited to coal, oil, gas, oil shale, uranium and
other nuclear materials, hot water, steam, and other geothermal materials or miner-
als, solar energy, wind, water, and water power and compressed air ....
Auvz. REv. STAT. AN. § 45-935B (Supp. 1981).
18. The pertinent part of the Arizona statute provides, "The board of supervisors shall
levy against each landowner in the district a tax equal to the unit rate multiplied by the
number of acres owned ...." Apuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1014B (1956). See AiUZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 45-1015 (1956).
19. "AUl bonds ... shall be a lien upon the real property included in the district .
ARtz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-1047 (1956).
20. See note 17 supra
21. Approximately 98% of the operating income of the district was derived from the gen-
eration and sale of electricity. Of the outstanding general obligations secured by a lien on the
thousand people22 in an area that includes a large portion of metro-
politan Phoenix.23 Nevertheless, the Arizona Legislature permits the
district to limit voting in director elections to registered voters who
own land within the district24 and to apportion voting power among
those landowners according to the number of acres owned.
25
Consequently, a class of registered voters who lived within the
boundaries of the district and who owned either no land or less than
one acre of land brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief. Petitioners alleged that the district held significant governmen-
tal powers26 and that its policies and actions substantially affected all
the people, regardless of property ownership, residing within the dis-
trict.27 Accordingly, the acreage-based system for electing directors
purportedly violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the consti-
tutionality of the voting system. On appeal, a divided panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
28
holding that the Salyer exception 29 was too narrow to be applicable,
and cited the principle of one person-one vote30 as controlling.
3'
The United States Supreme Court reversed.32 At issue was whether
the local governmental body had sufficiently narrow functions and a
lands of the voting members, all were serviced out of district electricity revenues. All capital
improvements were financed by revenue bonds, which were junior to the general obligation
bonds. 101 S. Ct. at 1816, 1826 (White, J., dissenting).
22. The district is the second largest utility in Arizona and sells to approximately 240,000
consumers. Id. at 1826 (White, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 1814.
24. The challenged Arizona statute provides,
No person shall be entitled to vote at any election held under the provisions of
this chapter unless he possesses all the qualifications required of electors for state
officers under the general election laws, and is the owner of record of real property
located within the boundaries of the district ....
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-909 (Supp. 1981) (amending Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-909
(1956)).
25. In 1969, the original one acre-one vote system was amended to permit owners of less
than one acre to cast fractional votes in proportion to their acreage. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-983C (Supp. 1981) (amending ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-983 (1956)).
26. The district is a governmental entity that may control water allocation within its serv-
ice area, condemn land, sell tax-exempt bonds, secure energy sources, and raise money
through an acreage-proportionate taxing power assessable on lands within the district. See
notes 9, 11, 15, 17, & 18, supra
27. See notes 13, 21 and accompanying text supra
28. James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180 (9th Cir 1979).
29. See notes 72-76 and accompanying text mfra.
30. See note 36 and accompanying text Mra
31. The court of appeals rejected the applicability of the Saler exception because
the electric utility operations of the District are so substantial in scope and are so
closely interwoven with the water delivery functions of the District that it is not a
special limited purpose district whose operations have a disproportionate effect on
landowners as a class. The principle of one person-one vote cannot be abridged in
these circumstances.
James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 185.
32. 101 S. Ct. 1811 (1981).
* special relationship to one class of citizens to justify release from the
strict demands of the one person-one vote principle of the equal pro-
tection clause.33
The question in Ball required the Supreme Court to review its
past rulings concerning the one person-one vote principle. In Reyn-
olds v. Sims,34 the Court held that the equal protection clause re-
quired35 adherence to the principle of one person-one vote36 in the
election of state legislators. 37  Because the right to vote38 is particu-
33. The Court stated,
The Court of Appeals was correct in conceiving the question in this case to be
whether the purpose of the District is sufficiently specialized and narrow and whether
its activities bear on landowners so disproportionately as to distinguish the District
from those public entities whose more general governmental functions demand appli-
cation of the Reynolds principle.
Id at 1816.
34. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
35. By 1963, two standards of review had begun to emerge in equal protection cases. The
more traditional standard is a rational relationship test. To satisfy this test, the statute must
have a permissible legislative purpose and the classifications must be reasonably related to that
purpose. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1968). See,
e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
The second standard, adopted in Reynolds, invokes strict scrutiny and requires the state to
bear a heavier burden of justification. If the court determines that a suspect classification or
fundamental interest is involved, the state must demonstrate that the law serves a compelling
state interest and that there is no less burdensome method to accomplish that purpose. Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972). See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
For a more complete discussion of these general principles and the suggestion of a third
"means-focus" test, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972). See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and
the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975).
36. Basically, the one person-one vote principle requires that all individual's votes be
equally weighted. This is achieved through equal population districting. See Comment, Equal
Protection. Analyzing the Dimensions ofa Fundamental Right-The Right to Vote, 17 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 163, 168 (1977). Dilution occurs when this balance is upset. "[lit is inconceiv-
able that ... the votes of citizens in one part of the state would be multiplied by two, five, or
10 [sic], while the votes of persons in another area would be counted only at face value, could
be constitutionally sustainable." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 562 See generally Walker, One
Man One Vote." In Pursuit ofan Elusive Ideal, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 453 (1976).
37. 377 U.S. at 568. After Reynolds, the Court demonstrated flexibility in applying the
one person-one vote principle to state legislative districts. A population variation of 16.4% was
upheld on the policy of maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines. Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973). In contrast, a population variance of 20.1% was not allowed "in
the absence of significant state policies or other acceptable considerations. ... Chapman v.
Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 24 (1974). With respect to district lines for local elections, the Court has
applied the Reynolds rationale and permitted a variance of 11.9%. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S.
182 (1971). When drawing lines for congressional district elections, however, the state must
justify each variance due to the large populations involved. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783
(1973) (4.13% variance not permitted).
38. The Supreme Court has indicated that the right to vote is not, per se, a constitution-
ally protected right. Nevertheless, "[t]he constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal
treatment in the voting process can no longer be doubted. ... San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74 (1973). See also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 96 (1965) (right to vote close to the core of our constitutional system). The term "right to
vote" is often used to signify the right to equal political participation. See Comment, Equal
Protection" Analyzing the Dimensions of a Fundamental Right-The Right to Vote, 17 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 163 (1977).
larly important in protecting other basic civil rights, any attempt to
restrict or dilute voting representation must be "meticulously
scrutinized."39
Extending Reynolds, the Court invalidated attempts to dilute
voting representation in local government unit elections in Avery v.
Midland County' ° and in the election of trustees to a community col-
lege in Hadley v. Jr. College District. " The Court found that both
the local unit42 and the trustees43 exercised general governmental
powers and performed important governmental functions." There-
fore, the Court closely scrutinized45 and rejected their voting systems
for failure to satisfy the one person-one vote principle.46 In both
cases, the Court expressly reserved ruling on the level of scrutiny
required for systems of electing "certain functionaries whose duties
are . . . far removed from normal governmental activities and...
39. 377 U.S. at 562. The Court stated,
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringe-
ment of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
Id at 561-62. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
40. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
41. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
42. The local government unit in question in Avery was the Midland County Commis-
sioners Court, the governing body for that county. The county was divided into four precincts,
with an elected commissioner from each precinct. In addition, the entire county elected one
at-large commissioner. One of the four districts had a population of 67,906; the other three
had populations of 852, 414, and 828. The Court found that the unit had power to make a
large number of decisions, which had a broad impact on all the citizens of the county. Disap-
proving of the electoral system, the Court announced a "ground rule for the development of
arrangements of local government: a requirement that units with general governmental pow-
ers over an entire geographic area not be apportioned among single-member districts of sub-
stantially unequal population." 390 U.S. at 485-86.
43. In Hadley the unit in question was the Junior College District of Metropolitan Kan-
sas City, which had six trustees. The Junior College District consisted of eight separate school
districts. The six trustees of the district were apportioned among the school districts according
to the number of persons between the ages of six and twenty, who resided in each school
district. This apportionment plan permitted only three (50%) of the trustees to be elected from
one school district even though it contained 60% of the described residents. The Court ruled
that the trustees exercised general governmental powers, therefore "[s]uch built-in discrimina-
tion against voters in large districts cannot be sustained as a sufficient compliance with the
constitutional mandate that each person's vote count as much as another's. 397 U.S. at
57.
44. In Avery, the Midland County Commissioners built and maintained the county jail,
hospitals, libraries, and airports. They also set tax rates, administered welfare services, deter-
mined school districts, equalized assessments, issued bonds, and prepared and adopted budg-
ets for allocating county funds. 390 U.S. at 475-77, 483-84.
In Hadley, the trustees could "levy and collect taxes, issue bonds. hire and fire teach-
ers, make contracts, collect fees, supervise and discipline students, pass on petitions to annex
school districts, acquire property by condemnation, and in general manage the operations of
the junior college .... " 397 U.S. at 53. The Court held that the trustees' powers were "not
fully as broad as those of the Midland County commissioners," but they were considered
equivalent "for apportionment purposes. ... Id
45. See note 35 supra.
46. See note 36 supra.
disproportionately affect different groups ....
In 1969, the Court similarly extended Reynolds by invalidating
a local government unit's franchise restriction, which was based on
property ownership.48  In Kramer v. Union Free School District49 the
Court ruled that when a property-based franchise restriction 50 is im-
plicated, the restriction must be necessary to reach a compelling state
interest. Thus, the class must be drawn narrowly enough to show
that all those excluded are substantially less interested or affected
than those the statutory system includes.5 In Cipriano v. Houmaa
52
and Phoenix v. Kolodziejski53 the Court applied the strict scrutiny
standard of the less interested or affected test,54 announced in
47. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. at 56. Although the Avery exception is
worded differently, its meaning is essentially the same.
Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of government assigned the
performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other
constituents, we would have to confront the question whether such a body may be
apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the
organization's functions.
390 U.S. at 483-84.
48. Property restrictions on the right to vote have historically been a topic of debate.
Blackstone stated, "The true reason of requiring any qualification with regard to property in
voters is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation as to be esteemed to have no will
of their own." Comment, Freeholder Requirements in the Montana Code Annotated" Unconsti-
tutional Restrictions on the Right of Political Participation, 41 MONT. L. REV. 97, 97 (1980)
(quoting W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 171 (1771-1773)).
Thomas Paine expressed his point of view with the following hypothetical:
You require that a man shall have sixty dollars' worth of property, or he shall
not vote. Very well, take an illustration. Here is a man who today owns a jackass,
and the jackass is worth sixty dollars. Today the man is a voter and goes to the polls
and deposits his vote. Tomorrow the jackass dies. The next day the man comes to
vote without his jackass and he cannot vote at all. Now tell me, which was the voter,
the man or the jackass?
Comment, The Last Bastion Crumbles: All Property Restrictions on the Franchise are Unconsti-
tutional, I N. MEX. L. REV. 403, 415 (1971) (quoting J. BURNS & J. PELTASON, GOVERNMENT
BY THE PEOPLE 251-52 (1952)).
49. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
50. In Kramer, the challenged statute made eligibility to vote in an annual school district
election dependent on one of three factors. In order to vote, a
district resident must either (1) be the owner or lessee of taxable real property located
in the district, (2) be the spouse of one who owns or leases qualifying property, or
(3) be the parent or guardian of a child enrolled for a specified time during the pre-
ceding year in a local district school.
Id at 623. A bachelor who neither owned nor leased taxable real property successfully chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the section. Id at 624-25.
51. The Kramer Court ruled,
Whether classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to those resident citizens
"primarily interested" deny those excluded equal protection of the laws depends, in-
ter alia, on whether all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or af-
fected than those the statute includes. In other words, the classifications must be
tailored so that the exclusion of appellant and members of his class is necessary to
achieve the articulated state goal.
Id at 632. Furthermore, the Court held that the restriction did not meet this substantially less
interested or affected test because it included persons who had a remote interest in school
affairs and excluded others who had a direct interest in the school meeting decisions. Id See
generaly Comment, Limitations on the Voting Franchise and the Standard of Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 15, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 143.
52. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
53. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
54. See note 51 supra
Kramer, to invalidate state laws that limited voting rights to prop-
erty taxpayers" in elections called to approve bond issues by a mu-
nicipal utility system and to decide on municipal improvements.
5 6
The A very-Hadley line of vote dilution cases57 and the Kramer-
Civriano-Kolodziejski line of vote restriction cases58 merged in
Sa yer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District. 59 In
Sayer, the voting system to elect the board of directors of the Tulare
Water District was apportioned by granting each district landowner
one vote for every one hundred dollars of assessed land valuation.60
The Tulare District encompassed 193,000 acres of farm land and had
a population of seventy-seven persons, most of whom were employ-
ees of one or another of the four corporations that farmed eighty-five
percent of the land in the district.61 Like the Salt River District in
Ball, the Tulare District exercised general authority over water ac-
quisition, storage, and distribution,62 which gave the district influ-
ence over flood control within the area.63 The district set prices for
the use of water, and the costs of the project were assessed against
the land in proportion to the services rendered.' Furthermore, the
Tulare District was granted the authority to generate and sell hydro-
electric power 5 but, unlike the Salt River District, Tulare did not
55. Decisions invalidating property restrictions on the franchise moved several commen-
tators to mark the end of the viability of the restriction. See Comment, The Last Bastion
Crumbles. Afl Property Restrictions on the Franchise are Unconstitutional, supra note 48; Note,
VotingRights-Ownership of Property No Longer a Valid Qualifcation, 23 S.W.L.J. 964 (1969).
But see Montgomery Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 464 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1971); Note,
Property Ownership Versus the Right to Vote: A Question ofEqual Protection, 25 S.W.L.J. 633
(1971).
56. In Cipriano, the challenged statute provided that only property taxpayers have the
right to vote in elections called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility
system. The bonds were secured by funds generated by the utility system and did not create an
enforceable lien against any property. The Court found that because "[p]roperty owners, like
non-property owners, use the utilities and pay the rates.., the benefits and burdens of the
bond issue fall indiscriminately on property owner and nonproperty owner alike." 395 U.S. at
705. Therefore, the statute failed the Kramer test and was rejected. Id at 706.
57. For recent decisions upholding statutes challenged for alleged dilution, see City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980) (multi-member districts); Lockport v. Citizens for
Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977) (concurrent majorities required); Cantwell v. Hudnut
566 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1977) (at-large voting).
58. Certain non-property restrictions on the right to vote have been upheld. See Holt v.
Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (residency within municipal boundaries required for voting in
municipal elections); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (disenfranchisement of ex-
felons); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (thirty day residency requirement). But
see Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (twenty-three month residency requirement not
permitted). See generally Note, State Restrictions on Municipal Elections.: An Equal Protection
Analysis, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1491 (1980).
59. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). A companion case, Associate Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Dist.,
410 U.S. 743 (1973), upheld a property limitation on the franchise in the creation and mainte-
nance of a Wyoming watershed improvement district.
60. 410 U.S. at 724 n.6. See also CALIF. WATER CODE § 41001 (West 1966).
61. 410 U.S. at 723.
62. Id See also CALIF. WATER CODE § 42200 (West 1966).
63. See note 67 infra,
64. 410 U.S. at 724. See also CALIF. WATER CODE § 43006 (West 1966).
65. 410 U.S. at 724. See also CALIF. WATER CODE §§ 43000, 43025 (West 1966).
exercise this authority.66 Thus, plaintiffs in Salyer claimed that the
property restriction on the franchise violated the equal protection
clause by disenfranchising non-landowners and resident lessees who
were substantially affected by the district's power over flood
control.
67
Because Salyer included a franchise restriction and a weighted
voting scheme, the system failed to fit neatly into previous methods
of analysis.68 With Salyer, however, the Court was afforded an op-
portunity to elaborate on the possible exception to the one person-
one vote principle announced in the vote dilution cases.69 The
Salyer majority found that the district exercised power far removed
from normal governmental activities. 70  The Court noted that al-
though the district held some governmental powers,7' its purpose
was limited to water control,72 its flood control activities were only
incidental to the primary purpose of water control,73 and it provided
no other general public services ordinarily attributed to a governing
body. 74 Moreover, the Court held that the district's activities dispro-
portionately affected landowners since all the costs of the district's
projects were assessed against landowners in proportion to the bene-
fits received.75 The Court ruled that since the district satisfied these
66. 410 U.S. at 729.
67. While four corporations farmed almost 85% of the land, one of those corporations,
Boswell, commanded enough votes to constitute a majority on the board of directors. Conse-
quently, under Boswell's control, no election had been held since 1947.
The Tulare Lake Basin was protected from floods by diverting water to the Buena Vista
Lake Basin. When floods menaced in 1969, the Boswell-dominated board tabled a motion that
would have commenced efforts to divert the flood waters to Buena Vista Lake. By tabling the
motion, Boswell protected its own long-term agricultural lease in Buena Vista Lake Basin
since flooding it would have interfered with the planting, growing, and harvesting of crops.
The result was that the water in the Tulare Lake Basin rose and one of the disenfranchised
residents found his home below 15 feet of water. Id at 735-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68. See Note, Salyer Land Co. P. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District.- Opening the
Floodgates in Local Special Government Elections, 72 MICH. L. REV. 868, 879-95 (1974).
69. See notes 42-44 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
70. 410 U.S. at 728-29.
71. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra
72. The Court observed that the Tulare Water District's "primary purpose, indeed the
reason for its existence, is to provide for the acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for
farming in the Tulare Lake Basin." 410 U.S. at 728.
73. Id at 728-29 n.8.
74. Explaining that the district did not possess normal governmental powers, the Court
noted,
It provides no other general public services such as schools, housing, transporta-
tion, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal
body .... There are no towns, shops, hospitals, or other facilities designed to im-
prove the quality of life within the district boundaries, and it does not have a fire
department, police, buses, or trains.
Id at 728-29.
75. Id at 729. In fact, the Supreme Court found that "there is no way that the economic
burdens of the district operations can fall on residents qua residents, and the operations of the
districts primarily affect the land within their boundaries." Id
This finding of disproportionate effects has been criticized for several reasons. First, a
finding of special purpose may presuppose a disproportionate effect. See Note, Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District." Opening the Floodgates in Local Special Gov-
criteria, the one person-one vote principle was inapplicable.76 Con-
sequently, the Court lowered the scrutiny of the franchise restriction
and upheld the voting system as "rationally based.""
Ball is the first United States Supreme Court case to apply di-
rectly the principles announced in Sayer. 78 While admitting that
the services of the Salt River District in Ball were more diverse and
affected more people than the Tulare District in Sayer,79 the Ball
majority applied the Salyer exception for three reasons. First, the
Ball Court ruled that the district did not exercise the type of govern-
mental powers that invoke the strict demands of Reynolds, 10 adding
that the provision of electricity is not a traditional element of govern-
mental sovereignty."' Second, the Ball majority determined that the
eminent Elections, 72 MICH. L. REV. 868, 883-95 (1974). Second, the Court focuses on eco-
nomic effects, substantially ignoring non-economic effects. See id; The Supreme Court, 1972
Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 94 (1973). Such an examination may allow a state to give control
of a government unit to a preferred class of voters by placing a monetary burden upon that
class. See Note, Constitutional Law - Voter Equality - Equal Protection - Special Purpose Unit
Exception to One-Man One- Vote, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,
1974 Wis. L. REV. 253. Third, showing that one group is more substantially affected than
another group does not necessarily justify the complete exclusion of the lesser affected class.
See 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 94 (1973) supra; Note, Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - State
Water District's Disenfranchisement of Nonlandowners and Weighted Voting among Landowners
Are Not Violations of the Equal Protection Clause, 22 KANSAS L. REV. 263 (1974); 72 MICH. L.
REV. 868 (1974) supra; 1974 Wis. L. REV. 253 suipra.
76. 410 U.S. at 730. The choice of the Avery-Hadley exception to the principle of one
person-one vote has been criticized. Avery and Hadley were decisions that dealt with the dilu-
tion of voting representation, while Saler concerned a system that totally disenfranchised
non-property owners. Language inAvery suggests the possibility of giving greater influence to
some voters, but does not suggest a complete exclusion of other voters from the electoral pro-
cess. See note 47 supra. Furthermore, although the Court adopts the Hadley exception lan-
guage, it does not adopt the same liberal attitude towards the classification of "normal"
governmental powers. See, e.g., note 44 and accompanying text supra; 22 KANsAs L. REV. 263
(1974), supra note 75; Note, Public Officials Represent Acres, Not People 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
227 (1974).
77. 410 U.S. at 735.
78. Other cases that have applied the Saler principle and found an exception present
include, e.g., Education/Instruccion, Inc. v. Moore, 503 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974) (regional
planning commission); Benner v. Oswald, 444 F. Supp. 545 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (The Penn-
sylvania State University Board of Trustees); Phillippart v. Hotchkiss Tract Reclamation Dist.
799, 54 Cal. App. 3d 797, 127 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1976) (reclamation district); Chesser v. Buchanan,
193 Colo. 471, 568 P.2d 39 (1977) (tunnel improvement district); Citizens v. McKee Creek
Watershed Dist., 37 Ill. App. 3d 935, 347 N.E.2d 41 (1975) (water district-appointed direc-
tors); Eastern v. Canty, 75 Ill. 2d 566, 389 N.E.2d 1160 (1979) (sanitation district).
For cases that have applied the Salyer principle and found that an exception was not
present see, e.g., Baker v. Regional H.S. Dist. No. 5, 520 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1975) (high school
district); Choudry v. Free, 17 Cal. 3d 660, 552 P.2d 438, 131 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1976) (irrigation
district); Johnson v. Lewistown Orchards Irrigation Dist., 99 Idaho 501, 584 P.2d 646 (1978)
(irrigation district); In re Ext. of Boundaries of Glaize Creek, 574 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. 1978)
(sewer district).
79. 101 S. Ct. at 1818.
80. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra
81. 101 S. Ct. at 1818-19. The majority cited Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345 (1974), to support the finding that provision of electricity is not a traditional element
of governmental sovereignty. In Jackson, a consumer of electricity brought suit for damages
and injunctive relief for termination of her electric service allegedly without notice, a hearing,
and an opportunity to pay the past due amount. Plaintiff claimed the termination was a state
action depriving her of property without due process of law. The Court held that "the supply-
ing of utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. ... Id at 353.
district's primary purpose--to store, conserve, and deliver water for
use by district landowners-was relatively narrow.82 Similar to the
finding in Sayer, the Ball Court noted that the power over flood
control was only incidental to the primary water functions.83 The
majority in Ball further ruled, however, that the electric power oper-
ations were incidental to the primary purpose of water control.
Therefore, even though ninety-eight percent of the costs of operating
the district were subsidized by revenue from electricity sales, which
included sales to disenfranchised non-property owners, the property-
based voting system was not subject to the requirements of Reyn-
olds. 84 In addition, the Ball Court found "no special constitutional
significance" 8 in the district's delivery of forty percent of the water
for non-agricultural purposes, since the district distributes the water
according to land ownership but does not control the use of water by
landowners. 6 Third, the Court found that an aspect of the limited
purpose of the district was the disproportionate relationship of the
functions of the district on landowners.87 The Court explained,
The Salyer opinion did not say that the selected class of voters for
a special public entity must be the only parties at all affected by
the operations of the entity, or that their entire economic well-
being must depend on that entity. Rather, the question was
whether the effect of the entity's operations on them was dispro-
portionately greater than the effect on those seeking the vote.
-s
Thus, the Court concluded that the purpose of the district was suffi-
ciently narrow, the effects were disproportionate, and the voting sys-
tem did not violate the equal protection clause because it was
reasonably related to statutory objectives.8 9
Similar policy reasons underlie the Court's decisions in Saer
and Ball. The majority deemed the voting restrictions rational be-
cause the Court was convinced that the subscriptions of land which
ultimately formed the districts might have never occurred unless the
subscribing landowners were assured a special voice in district busi-
Thus, termination of her electric service was not a state action and the due process challenge
failed. Moreover, the Court noted that if it were dealing with a power "traditionally associated
with sovereignty, such as eminent domain, our case would be quite a different one." Id Since
the Salt River District in Ball does have the power of eminent domain, see note 15 supra, the
majority's reliance on Jackson is questionable. See also note 84 infra.
82. 101 S. Ct. at 1818.
83. Id at 1819 n.12.
84. Id at 1819. The dissent noted that the majority's reliance on Jackson was misplaced:
"[The question whether the Fourteenth Amendment may require certain safeguards f the
State infact does itself provide utility services is in no way reached by Jackson. " Id at 1828
n.10 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
85. Id at 1819.
86. Id
87. Id at 1820.
88. Id at 1820-21.
89. Id at 1821.
ness.9 ° Furthermore, weighted voting systems were permitted be-
cause the Court believed that voting power was reasonably
apportioned according to the relative risks, benefits, and burdens in-
curred by the landowners from operations of the district.9 Ball is
significant because, unlike Sayer, a portion of the actual costs of
operating the district were placed directly on thousands of disen-
franchised persons,92 yet the voting restriction was permitted.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell urged that the Arizona
Legislature should be permitted to experiment with political struc-
tures to meet novel local problems. Since the Legislature was elected
in accordance with Reynolds principles, Justice Powell declared
there existed an adequate political safeguard, which prevented po-
tential abuses of the right to vote. 93
The dissenters in Ball argued that the majority misapplied the
principles of Sayer. Justice White, writing for the dissenters, as-
serted that the Salt River District in Ball did exercise substantial
governmental powers and noted that in Cipriano, 94 provision of utili-
ties to a city was sufficiently broad governmental power 95 to require
close judicial scrutiny. Similarly, language in Saiyer intimated that
operating a utility was a normal governmental activity.96 The dis-
sent focused primarily on the effects of district functions. While ac-
knowledging that the Tulare District considered in Sa/yer did have a
disproportionate effect on voters since few people lived within the
boundaries of the district and the burdens fell directly on landown-
ers,97 the dissent contended that the Salt River District had a much
more substantial impact on non-voters because of its broad govern-
mental functions coupled with the effects of its flood control and hy-
droelectric power functions. Therefore, Kramer mandated strict
90. ld; 410 U.S. at 731. For a complete history of the Salt River Project, see Ball v.
James, 101 S. Ct. at 1814; Comment, Voter Restrictions in Special Districts. A Case Study ofthe
Salt River Project, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 636.
91. 101 S. Ct. at 1821; 410 U.S. at 734 (quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District,
342 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D. Ca. 1972)).
92. 101 S. Ct. at 1827, 1829 (White, J., dissenting).
93. Id at 1821-22 (Powell, J., concurring). Responding to Justice Powell, the dissent in
Ball noted that relying on a state legislature elected according to Reynolds principles has been
held to be an inadequate safeguard in the past. 101 S. Ct. at 1829 n.I I (White, J., dissenting).
The dissent relied on Avery: "That the state legislature may itself be properly apportioned
does not exempt subdivisions from the Fourteenth Amendment." Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. at 481.
94. Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
95. 101 S. Ct. at 1829 (White, J., dissenting).
96. 101 S. Ct. at 1825 (White, J., dissenting). See note 74 supra The dissent objected to
the majority's classification of the powers as non-governmental, seeing the classification as a
return to the proprietary-governmental distinction. The dissent argued that this distinction is
"so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for adequate
formulation." 101 S. Ct. at 1829 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 438 U.S. 389, 433 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
97. 101 S. Ct. at 1824 (White, J., dissenting).
scrutiny98 in Ball. The dissent termed "curious"99 the majority's
characterization of these functions as incidental, and noted, "Unlike
the situation in Salyer, the financial burden of supplying irrigation
water has been shifted from the landowners to consumers of electric-
ity.'' 1° Finally, the dissenters urged that "the purpose and authority
of the Salt River District [were] of extreme public importance"' 0 '
and therefore the right to vote had to be extended to the
disenfranchised.1
0 2
In Salyer, the Supreme Court found an exception 0 3 under the
equal protection clause to the application of strict scrutiny to prop-
erty-based voting restrictions' 04 and therefore permitted a voting sys-
tem reasonably related to its objectives. 0 5  Ball expands this
exception.'0 6 Under the Ball approach, the Court focuses on the
purpose for which the special governmental district was established;
if the purpose is sufficiently narrow, other grants of authority may be
dismissed as incidental and constitutionally insignificant.0 7 Addi-
tionally, if it can be shown that the effects of this purpose fall dispro-
portionately, a voting system may restrict and weight the franchise
despite the fact that non-voters pay the costs of district operations. 
0 8
The Court, however, was reluctant to examine the effects of the dis-
trict beyond those of the primary purpose.0 9
This deference to state legislatures is designed to allow a local
entity the power to deal with a local problem in an expedient man-
ner." 0 Currently, the only local problem necessitating expediency
and warranting deference at the United States Supreme Court level
is water conservation."' The effect of such deference is a retreat
98. Id. at 1824-830 (White, J., dissenting).
99. Id at 1826 (White, J., dissenting).
100. Id at 1827 (White, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1829 (White, J., dissenting).
102. Id at 1829-30 (White, J., dissenting).
103. See notes 72-76 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 35, 50 & 51 and accompanying text supra
105. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
106. Two Justices have rejected the expansion of the Salyer exception. In Salyer, Chief
Justice Burger, with Justices Blackmun, Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, and White were in the
majority. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. Since Salyer, however, Justice
Stevens has replaced Justice Douglas and voted with the majority in Ball. Justices Blackmun
and White have defected from the Salyer majority to dissent in Ball resulting in the 5-4 vote.
It is difficult to determine if this narrow margin remains intact today because Justice Stewart,
who wrote the opinion in Ball has been replaced by Justice O'Connor.
107. See notes 83, 84 and accompanying text supra.
108. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 75, 88 and accompanying text supra.
110. 101 S. Ct. at 1821-22 (Powell, J., concurring).
111. The problem of water conservation is one of great magnitude in the western portion
of the United States, which may explain the Court's deference to the Arizona Legislature's
solution. In Salyer, the Court offered a lengthy description of the problems of water manage-
ment in the West. Describing the availability of water as a continuous cycle of "feast or fam-
ine," the Court noted that "the full resources of the State and frequently of the Federal
Government were necessary" to control the supply of water. 410 U.S. at 722. Therefore, the
from the vigorous protection of voting as a fundamental right and as
a guardian of other basic civil rights. 1 2 Language in Ball suggests
that if a state legislature is elected in accordance with Reynolds, an
adequate political remedy exists against alleged infringements of
voting rights at the local level. Prior to Ball, such reasoning was not
accepted. 1 3 The expansion of Salver's principles in Ball makes it
difficult to define the current limits of the exception to the one per-
son-one vote principle. The Ball decision, however, does indicate
that Salver was more than an isolated exception. Indeed, Ball may
be the harbinger of a broadening trend.
states "authorized a number of instrumentalities, including water storage districts.., to pro-
vide a local response to water problems." Id See generally Martin, Local Reapportionment:
The Exemption of Water Management Districts, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 31 (1973). See also
Martin, "One Person, One Vote" and California's Water Districts, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 9
(1975).
112. See notes 38, 39 and accompanying text supra; The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87
HARV. L. REV. 55, 94 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-State Water Dis-
trict's Disenfranchisement of Nonlandowners and Weighted Voting among Landowners Are Not
Violations of the Equal Protection Clause, 22 KANSAS L. REV. 263 (1974); Note, Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District." Opening the Floodgates in Local Special Gov-
ernment Elections, 72 MICH. L. REV. 868 (1974); Note, Constitutional Law--Voter Equality-
Equal Protection-Special Purpose Unit Exception to One-Man One- Vote, Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 253.
113. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
[Casenote by Shaun R. Eisenhauer]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPELLED
SELF-INCRIMINATION-No ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION
Is REQUIRED ON REQUEST IN STATE TRIALS. Carter v. Ken-
tucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981).
In Carter v. Kentucky, I a divided2 United States Supreme Court
concluded that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion3 requires state judges to instruct jurors, upon proper request,
that no adverse inferences' should be drawn from the accused's si-
lence.5 By using a no adverse inference instruction, courts may
"minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a
defendant's failure to testify."6 Since petitioner Carter's proffered
instructions7 accurately represented the fifth amendment privilege,
the Court held that the refusal of the trial court to give Carter's in-
structions and the substitution of less accurate instructions8 "ex-
act[ed] an impermissible toll on the full and free exercise of the
privilege."9 In reaching its decision, the Court established affirma-
tive and specific jury instructions for non-testifying state defendants.
1. 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981). The per curiam memorandum opinion of the Supreme Court
of Kentucky, Carter v. Commonwealth, 598 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1980), is unreported.
2. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, and was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opin-
ion. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice
Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion.
3. The privilege against compelled self-incrimination provides,
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
4. An adverse inference can arise when jurors speculate about why a defendant does not
answer the State's accusation against him. The least favorable inference--and the most likely
to occur-is an inference of guilt.
5. Justice Stewart did not define the parameters of a proper instruction. Presumably,
variants of the following, which was offered by the defendant in Carter, are proper: "[Tihe
defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an infer-
ence of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way." 101 S. Ct. at 1113.
6. Id at 1122.
7. See note 5 supra.
8. The majority opinion did not reveal the entire instruction given. Justice Stewart
mentions, however, that the jurors "were instructed to determine guilt 'from the evidence
alone.'" 101 S Ct. at 1121. Moreover, the trial court said that " 'the law presumes a defendant
to be innocent."' Id
9. Id
In the early morning of December 22, 1978, Deborah Ellison, a
municipal police officer in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, discovered two
men in an alley. On the flash of Ellison's spotlight, the two men fled.
In her search of the alley, Ellison found two jackets and a hole in the
side of a hardware store with some merchandise apparently removed
from it. She radioed Officer Leroy Davis, who patrolled an adjacent
area. Davis observed two men running across a street and pursued
one of them, Lonnie Joe Carter. During the chase, Davis saw Carter
drop a gym bag and a radio.'0 When Davis apprehended him,
Carter was wearing gloves but no jacket. Although Ellison could not
positively identify him, Carter allegedly admitted that the two jack-
ets previously found by Ellison belonged to him.'"
At trial, the judge explained to prospective jurors that Carter's
indictment for third-degree burglary 2 did not constitute evidence of
guilt.'3 Realizing that his credibility would probably be impeached
because he had a criminal record, Carter did not testify.' 4 After the
court refused Carter's proffered instructions,' 5 the prosecutor closed
with repeated allusions to Carter's failure to testify.'
6
The jury found Carter guilty of third-degree burglary and recid-
ivism. On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected Carter's ar-
gument that the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution require state judges to give a no adverse infer-
ence instruction on request and held that the precaution itself was an
adverse comment. 7 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
10. The radio was tuned to a police band. Id at 1114.
II. Id at 1115 n.5.
12. Carter was also indicted as a persistent felony offender. Id at 1114.
13. The trial judge addressed the prospective jurors as follows:
Sometimes it is not easy to do, but you are to put out of your mind that fact that
he is accused of this crime to the point where you will not consider him in any way
guilty unless and until the Commonwealth meets its burden and by that I mean the
Commonwealth must prove his guilt to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt
and if they fail to do that, you should not find him guilty.
Id at 1115 n.3.
14. The defense counsel summarized his private conversation with Carter regarding the
latter's criminal record in the following words: "'IThe advice of counsel to Mr. Carter was
that in plain terms he was between a rock and a hard place.'" Id at 1115 n.4. The court
admonished the prosecutor not to introduce more than three prior convictions. Id
15. See note 5 supra
16. The prosecutor announced that he would review only the evidence "'that we were
privileged to hear."' Id at 1116. In addition, he cautioned the jury to "'[c]onsider only what
you have heard up here as evidence in this case and not something you might speculate hap-
pened or could have happened."' Id Pointing to exhibits, the prosecutor stated it was "'un-
controverted'" that the bag and the radio belonged to Carter and that he was the man spotted
by Ellison and apprehended by Davis. Id Concluding with Carter's alleged admissions, the
prosecutor said "that if there was a reasonable explanation why the petitioner ran when he saw
the police, it was 'not in the record."' Id
17. The court's decision was based on a Kentucky statute, which provides as follows: "In
any criminal or penal prosecution the defendant, on his own request, shall be allowed to testify
in his own behalf, but his failure to do so shall not be commented upon or create any presump-
tion against him." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.225 (Baldwin 1969). The Kentucky policy on
adverse comment through admonitory instructions varied in the last decade. In Spencer v.
tiorari t8 to consider for the first time whether state defendants who
do not testify are constitutionally entitled to a no adverse inference
instruction on request.
The privilege against self-incrimination developed in England
and America to protect the accused from inquisitions into crimes
"that were essentially political and religious in nature."' 9 Originally
the privilege prohibited torture,2" but when the Bill of Rights was
adopted, the privilege was considered a guarantee of individual sov-
ereignty. 2' Presently, the privilege represents the policy that defend-
ants should be protected from zealous prosecutors.22 More
significantly, it recognizes that because the individual is sovereign,
due process requires a proper balance between the accused's right to
quietude and the State's need for incriminating evidence.23
Prior to 1965, the federal constitution did not protect state de-
fendants from adverse comments by courts.24 In Twining v. New
Jersey, 25 the United States Supreme Court declared that the fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination was not
incorporated by the fourteenth amendment. The Twining doctrine
held that the privilege did not represent "an unchangeable principle
of universal justice but. . . a law proved by experience to be expedi-
ent."'26 Moreover, the doctrine permitted states to experiment with
the privilege.27 Thus, Twining belonged to the mainstream of crimi-
nal constitutional thinking that sought to incorporate only those ele-
Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Ky. 1971), the court decided that "the defendant is
entitled to an instruction when properly requested." That decision, grounded on recent federal
cases, caused three defendants to argue individually that they were entitled to a no adverse
inference instruction. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 495 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1973); Green v. Com-
monwealth, 488 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1972); Dixon v. Commonwealth, 478 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1972).
In Scott, the court said, "In fact the author of Spencer is now the author of the opinion in
the instant case, which all goes to prove that a careless foxhound may sometimes lead the
whole pack astray. We now repudiate the dictum in Spencer. Id at 802.
18. Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980).
19. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT-THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIM-
INATION 377 (1968).
20. One defendant held in contempt for refusing to take the oath ex officio was beaten
during a two-mile walk to the pillory. "Tied to the back of a cart and stripped to the waist, he
was lashed every few steps with a three-thonged whip tied full of knots." Id at 276. The oath
was used by ecclesiastical courts to compel sworn defendants to provide evidence that sup-
ported the prosecutor's argument for guilt.
In an earlier case, the trial judge coerced a confession from the defendant by suggesting
that if he would not submit to trial, he would be exposed, naked, outside the prison, with
weights continually laid on him, and fed coarse bread and contaminanted water on alternate
days. The Tryal of Richard Weston, 13 Jac. I (1615), reported in 1 COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS 235 (1719).
21. L. LEVY, supra note 19, at 431.
22. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
23. Id The federal balance considers not whether state action is inhumane, but whether
an accused incriminates himself voluntarily.
24. For background on the decision that prohibited adverse comment by courts and pros-
ecutors, see note 38 and accompanying text infra.
25. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
26. Id at 113.
27. The Court explained, "The power of [the states'] people ought not to be fettered, their
ments in the Bill of Rights without which courts could not provide
justice."8 Later, the Twining doctrine was extended to permit ad-
verse comments by state prosecutors against non-testifying
defendants.29
A second standard, however, arose for federal cases. In Bruno v.
United States, 30 the Court held that federal defendants must be
granted a no adverse inference instruction on request. The Bruno
Court inferred from a federal statute3 1 that the legislature intended
federal courts to give the requested instruction to preserve substan-
tially the presumption of innocence. 32 Although the Court suggested
that jurors do not necessarily withhold prejudice from the defendant
in response to the instruction, the Court could not deny that the ac-
cused may be benefited when jurors are informed that silence is not
evidence of guilt.3 3 The Twining doctrine resisted the inference that
state jurors may react with similar favor to the non-testifying state
defendant.
Twenty-five years after Bruno, the United States Supreme
Court, in Malloy v. Hogan, 34 departed from the Twining doctrine.
The Malloy Court declared that Twining incorrectly held the fifth
amendment privilege to be "a mere rule of evidence. 35 Because a
sense of responsibility lessened, and their capacity for sober and restrained self-government
weakened by forced construction of the Federal Constitution." Id at 114.
For a persuasive historical analysis supporting the Twining doctrine, see Fairman, Does
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 5 (1949).
28. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Justice Cardozo discussed why the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment could be excluded by state legislatures and
justice still be provided in the courts of those states. Justice Cardozo ranked specific elements
of the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of thought, as fundamental, and others as incidental to
justice.
29. In Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), the Supreme Court permitted adverse
comment by prosecutors.
30. 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
31. The Bruno Court addressed legislation substantially similar to the following statute:
In a trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the
United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in any
State, District, Possession or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own request,
be a competent witness. His failure to make such request shall not create any pre-
sumption against him.
Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 772, c. 645, § 3481, 62 Stat. 833 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481
(1969) (derived from Act of Mar. 16, 1878, c. 37, § 1200, 20 Stat. 833)).
32. 308 U.S. at 293.
33. Id The Bruno Court stated a classic judicial apology that provided a foundation for
the limits of constitutional inquiry into the psychological operation of the minds of jurors.
Certainly, despite the vast accumulation of psychological data, we have not yet at-
tained that certitude about the human mind which would justify us in disregarding
the will of Congress by a dogmatic assumption that jurors, if properly admonished,
neither could nor would heed the instructions of the trial court that the failure of an
accuscd to be a witness in his own cause 'shall not create any presumption against
him.'
Id at 294.
34. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
35. Id at 9. Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Malloy, believed that
the Twining Court underestiated the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
series of Supreme Court cases held that the fourteenth amendment
forbids state coercion to obtain confessions, the Malloy Court rea-
soned that state due process merged into a federal standard.36 The
fifth amendment privilege became recognized as a fundamental prin-
ciple under the Maloy declaration.
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the
same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against fed-
eral infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to
suffer no penalty, as held in Twining, for such silence.
37
Thus, the use of a federal standard, found in the fifth amendment,
prepared a foundation for the Carter Court to incorporate the Bruno
instruction.
In Groin v. Calfornia, 38 the federal statute discussed in Bruno
was held to prohibit adverse comment by state prosecutors and
courts. Referring to the federal standard established in Malloy, the
Court held that the fifth amendment reflects the purposes of the fed-
eral statute discussed in Bruno. 39  Consequently, the American sys-
tem of criminal justice disfavors adverse comment against non-
testifying defendants so that the pressures of the trial do not enhance
the prosecutor's argument. 4° Because the accused is presumed inno-
cent, adverse comment "cuts down on the privilege by making its
assertion costly."'" Therefore, the Groin Court determined that trial
nation. He declared that the privilege is more than a rule of evidence, it is a fundamental
principle of justice. Justice Brennan drew this distinction from Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). In Mapp, the Court applied the exclusionary rule of evidence to protect state defend-
ants from compelled self-incrimination in search and seizure violation cases.
The Malloy rationale was built on Mapp's exclusionary rule. Consequently, the close
alignment of the fourth and fifth amendment prohibitions against compelled self-incrimina-
tion enabled the Malloy Court to incorporate the fifth amendment privilege into the fourteenth
amendment. Both decisions, therefore, provided that the state prove guilt on an independent
basis.
36. The Malloy Court was influenced by several earlier decisions. See Haynes v. Wash-
ington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (preventing an accused from calling his wife or attorney until he
confessed was official misconduct); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (no confessions
from sympathy falsely aroused); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (accused's free
choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer).
37. 378 U.S. at 7.
38. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
39. In Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893), the Supreme Court held that an 1878
statute, prohibiting adverse presumptions against non-testifying defendants, also prohibited
adverse comment in federal trials. See note 31 supra.
40. The Wilson Court identified why defendants may refuse to testify.
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely inno-
cent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others
and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged
against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase
rather than remove prejudice against him.
Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 67 (1893).
41. 380 U.S. at 614. Currently, to compel a defendant to incriminate himself is not sim-
ply to force his confession; the concept encompasses the adverse presumption of the jury that
arises from adverse comment by the court or prosecutor on the defendant's failure to testify.
See text accompanying note 64 infiz.
judges must exercise impartiality4 2 and concomitant persuasiveness 43
toward jurors to ensure a proper balance between the accused and
the state.
The failure of Groin to identify a defendant's specific rights
weakened the trend toward absolute individual sovereignty. The de-
cision did not propose a threshold for reversible error. Although
Groin prohibited the instruction that the defendant's silence corrob-
orated the prosecutor's evidence, the Court did not determine
whether the trial court could refer to that silence for other purposes.
Another open issue was whether the accused could object to unre-
quested references by the trial court to this silence. Furthermore, the
Groin Court specifically withheld consideration of the Carter ques-
tion whether the accused can properly expect the trial court to in-
struct jurors, upon request, that the failure to testify must create no
inferences of guilt.' One commentator claimed that the Court acted
without considering the common-sense application of its rule.°5
In Chapman v. California,46 the Court diminished the favorable
effect of the Groin no adverse comment rule on the defense of non-
testifying defendants. The Chapman Court adopted a formula to de-
termine the threshold of reversible error for cases in which the no
adverse comment rule is abused. The Court limited its harmless er-
ror test 47 to the prejudicial impact of improperly admitted evi-
dence.48 Under an impact analysis, courts must determine whether
42. See generally A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL
JUDGE, § 1.1(a) (Approved Draft 1972).
43. Id The trial judge's persuasiveness should be used in the orderly administration of
justice. The Grfin Court recognized, however, that the trial judge's charges to the jury may
have an improper evidentiary value under the fifth amendment privilege. In his majority
opinion, Justice Douglas explained, "What the jury may infer, given no help from the court is
one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evi-
dence against him is quite another." 380 U.S. at 614.
44. The Groin Court reserved judgment on the issue addressed in Carter. "We reserve
decision on whether an accused can require, as in [Bruno], that the jury be instructed that his
silence must be disregarded." Id at 615 n.6.
45. Chief Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of California remarked, "It is not too
much to hope that the Supreme Court will formulate the rules with a high sense of responsibil-
ity for their far-reaching consequences and will make transitions from one case to another that
keep peace between the Constitution and common sense." Traynor, The Devils of Due Process
in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 657, 680 (1966)
Two states read Groin as an affirmative statement requiring a no adverse inference in-
struction on request. See Hines v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 905, 234 S.E.2d 262 (1977); State
v. Smith, 100 N.J. Super. 420, 242 A.2d 49 (1967).
46. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
47. Harmless error is a generic term that is applied when constitutional error does not
require reversal. In criminal cases, the party who benefits from a constitutional error must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict in the court
below. Different harmless error tests may be suited to varying situations: "Granted the neces-
sity of showing harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, the question remains how to make
the showing of harmlessness." Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Er-
ror-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15, 16 (1976).
48. The Chapman Court explained the impact test as follows: "The question is whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction." 386 U.S. at 24 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
the adverse comment on the accused's failure to testify was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.49
After the Chapman decision, however, the Court suggested an-
other harmless error test that may be less favorable to the non-testi-
fying defendant.5" The overwhelming test requires appellate courts
to determine whether the properly admitted evidence, indicative of
guilt, clearly overwhelms the prejudicial error of adverse comment
on the accused's failure to testify.5' Because the overwhelming test
balances admissible and inadmissible evidence, it signals a retreat
from scrutiny of adverse comments alone and from a trend toward
emphasizing the individual sovereignty of state defendants.
The return to the defendant's favor, inherent in the no adverse
inference instruction required by Carter, will depend ultimately on
the effect of a harmless error test on that instruction. Justice Stewart
specifically postponed consideration of harmless error in Carter. 52
The Court, however, may condition the right to a requested no ad-
verse inference instruction.
The threshold for reversible error, lower with the impact test
53
than the overwhelming test,54 provides insight into the need for flex-
ibility in a harmless error test. The overwhelming test inadequately
addresses the effect of a judge's failure to give a no adverse inference
instruction; the evidentiary value of no instruction may be either in-
significant or prejudicial. In addition, reversible error may arise if
the charge insufficiently represented the privilege.55 Consequently,
the accused could be penalized for requesting an unduly favorable
instruction.56 The Supreme Court should decide which test, if any,
best preserves the privilege.57
In Lakeside v. Oregon,58 the Supreme Court answered a second
question unaddressed by Grifn-whether the accused could object
to an unrequested no adverse inference instruction. The Lakeside
Court held that state trial courts may give the instruction over the
49. But see State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, -, 616 P.2d, 1034, 1054 n.10 (1980) (Bistline,
J., dissenting) (beyond a reasonable doubt inadequately addresses the violation of a constitu-
tional right).
50. See generally Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (overwhelming evidence
test).
For a thorough analysis of each test, including a third test that arose in Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (cumulative effect of proper evidence), see Field, SUpra note 47.
51. See generally State v. Fendler, 127 Ariz. 464, 622 P.2d 23 (1980); State v. Goodall,
407 A.2d 268 (Me. 1979); State v. Clark, - Minn. -, 296 N.W.2d 359 (1981).
52. 101 S. Ct. at 1121.
53. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 50, 51 and accompanying text supra.
55. See Denson v. State, 50 Ala. App. 414, 279 So. 2d 580 (1973).
56. See Johns v. State, 114 Wis. 2d 119, 109 N.W.2d 490 (1961).
57. For an argument that the impact test best preserves constitutional principles see
Field, supra note 47.
58. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
defendant's objection. Lakeside, however, created at least two
sources of tension with the Grfin decision. Whereas the Grffin no
adverse comment rule favored non-testifying defendants, Lakeside
withdrew some of the accused's control over jury instructions. In
addition, Grifn reserved the possibility that under some circum-
stances, jurors could be prejudiced against the accused by a no ad-
verse inference instruction.59 The Lakeside Court assumed that the
instruction "removed from the jury's deliberation any influence of
unspoken adverse inferences."60 Carter balances Griffln and Lake-
side byl preserving this assumption. The Carter Court inquired into
the jurors' understanding of the law, not their psychological reaction
to the no adverse inference instruction. Lakeside and Carter affirm
the judge's discretion to charge the jury without diminishing the ac-
cused's right to instructions that help jurors understand the fifth
amendment privilege.6"
The Carter Court inherited a refined definition of compelled
self-incrimination. In contrast to the common-law methods of
threats and torture,62 the fifth amendment privilege currently ad-
dresses penalties63 and costs64 that inhere in the jury's unguided per-
ception of the accused's silence. Although the Supreme Court has
rejected a constitutional analysis grounded on speculation regarding
jurors' perceptions, defense attorneys may attempt to affect the ju-
rors emotionally through the no adverse inference instruction.
59. Justice Stevens, in his Lakeside dissent, recalled one premise of Griffin that Lakeside
discarded: "When the jurors have in fact overlooked it, telling them to ignore the defendant's
silence is like telling them not to think of a white bear." Id at 345. In Carter, he reiterated a
belief that the defendant has absolute control over the no adverse inference instruction. 101 S.
Ct. at 1123.
For criticism of the Burger Court's concept of the fifth amendment privilege see Ritchie,
Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1977); Com-
ment, Prosecutorial Comment and Judicial Instruction on a Defendant's Failure to Testify: In
Support of a Liberal Application ofthe Ffth Amendment, 13 VAL. U. L. REV. 261 (1979).
60. 435 U.S. at 339. Justice Stewart explained, "The very purpose of the jury charge is to
flag the jurors' attention to concepts that must not be misunderstood, such as reasonable doubt
and burden of proof. To instruct them in the meaning of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is no different." Id at 340.
61. Lakeside and Carter permit flexibility when one defendant objects to the no adverse
inference instruction requested by his co-defendant. See State v. McNeil, 164 N.J. Super. 27,
395 A.2d 549 (1978).
An attempt to restrict trial court discretion failed in England. In Reg. v. Sparrow, [1973 1
W.L.R. 488 (C.A.), an English court described the extent of the trial judge's discretion.
[The judge] and the jury try the case together and it is his duty to give them the
benefit of his knowledge of the law and to advise them in light of his experience as to
the significance of the evidence, and when an accused person elects not to give evi-
dence, in most cases but not all the judge should explain to the jury what the conse-
quences of his absence from the witness box are, and if, in his discretion, he thinks
that he should do so more than once he may, but he must keep in mind always his
duty to be fair.
Id at 495.
62. See note 20 suprz
63. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
64. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
Therefore, the Carter decision confers jury access to the state ac-
cused and may minimize the tension between defense strategy and
the practical limits of the fifth amendment privilege.
Implicit in permitting the accused access to jurors through the
judge's charges is a judicial duty to preserve the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege. In Taylor v. Kentucky, 65 the Court explained
that trial courts have a duty to protect the fifth amendment presump-
tion of innocence. Because the judge's charges may be more authori-
tative than defense counsel's arguments, 66 the Carter rationale is
premised on a transfer of credibility from the trial court to the ac-
cused. This benefit to the accused does not increase the prosecutor's
evidentiary burden. The judge's charge does not constitute evidence
for the defense when it properly represents the law. 67 Therefore, the
no adverse inference instruction limits the State to independently se-
cured evidence.68 Carter suggests that the cost to the State is less
than the toll on the accused absent such instruction.
69
Although Carter answers the question raised in Gr!fin whether
an accused has a right to a no adverse inference instruction,70 Carter
is not premised on Grifn. State court decisions announced after
Gr/in that provide a privilege similar to the fifth amendment pnvi-
lege support Carter but do not suggest the Carter Court's rationale.7
Justice Stewart traced the privilege to Bruno:7 2 "[I]t is plain that
65. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
66. The Taylor Court recognized that "arguments of counsel cannot substitute for in-
structions by the court." Id at 485-89. Thus, to preserve the accused's privilege, the four-
teenth amendment often requires a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence. In
Taylor, the accused and the victim participated in a swearing contest during the trial. The
Court maintained, "The 'purging' effect of an instruction on the presumption of innocence...
simply represents one means of protecting the accused's constitutional ight to be judged solely
on the basis of proof adduced at trial." Id at 486.
67. See notes 43, 60, 61 and accompanying text supra.
68. The Malloy Court claimed that states adopted the federal standard against compelled
self-incrimination under the principle that confessions must be free and voluntary. See note
23 and accompanying text suprat The Court noted, "IT]he American system of criminal prose-
cution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial and. . the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential
mainstay." 378 U.S. at 7.
69. Conversely, the constitutional balance in Lakeside suggests that the judge's discre-
tionary no adverse inference instruction given over the accused's objection, affects the defend-
ant less severely than the state absent such discretion. See Note, Criminal Procedure-Judicial
Comment on Failure of Accused to Tesify Allowed, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 74, 87 (1978).
70. See note 44 supra
71. State decisions that arose after Grffin but independently reached the Carter result
include the following: State v. Dean 8 Ariz. App. 508, 447 P.2d 890 (1968); Clay v. State, 236
Ga. 398, 224 S.E.2d 14 (1976); State v. Baxter, 51 Hawaii 157, 454 P.2d 366 (1969); Pearson v.
State, 28 Md. App. 196, 343 A.2d 916 (1975) (dictum); State v. Angel, 520 S.W.2d 687 (Mo.
App. 1975) (dictum); State v. Smith, 100 N.J. Super. 420, 242 A.2d 49 (1967) (grounded on
Griffin); State v. Spearman, 84 N.M. 366, 503 P.2d 649 (1972); People v. Britt 43 N.Y.2d 111,
371 N.E.2d 504, 400 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1977); State v. Butcher 13 N.C. App. 97, 185 S.E.2d 11
(1971); State v. Wade, 31 Ohio App. 2d 33, 285 N.E.2d 898 (1972); State v. Hale, 22 Or. App.
144, 537 P.2d 1173 (1975); State v. Emrick, 129 Vt. 330, 278 A.2d 712 (1971); Hines v. Com-
monwealth, 217 Va. 905, 234 S.E.2d 262 (1977) (influenced by Griffi); Champlain v. State, 53
Wis. 2d 751, 193 N.W.2d 868 (1972).
72. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text suprao
[Bruno] was influenced by the absolute constitutional guarantee
against compulsory self-incrimination."" Instead of directly de-
scending from Groin, Carter represents a separate statement without
precedent of compromise.74
The Supreme Court has anticipated the no adverse inference
question for seventeen years. Carter represents an affirmative and
specific answer that addresses the practical limits of the fifth amend-
ment privilege. 7  Because the standard established by the Court in-
creases the defendant's access to the jury, it will likely stimulate
concern for state interests and trial court discretion.76 The Court
may compromise the privileged instruction by favoring harmless er-
ror.77 Thus, the harmless error test must remain flexible if it is to
preserve the fifth amendment privilege. Until that time, however,
Carter must be recognized as a significant attempt to enhance the
individual sovereignty of state defendants.
73. 101 S. Ct. at 1119. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell suggested that Gri~n,
not the Constitution, requires the Carter decision. Id at 1122. He distinguished the fifth
amendment prohibition against compulsion and the Griffin principle that state defendants
should not pay for their silence. The Malloy Court, however, harmonized these concepts in
reaction to the Twining doctrine. Thus, the.fifth amendment embodies values attributed to the
privilege against self-incrimination that the literal text does not reveal. See note 35 and ac-
companying text supra.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, referred to the majority opinion as possessing
a "singular paucity of reasoning." 101 S. Ct. at 1123. Justice Rehnquist contended that the
Court should address principles of federalism instead of burdens on individual sovereignty.
This approach, however, does not consider the Court's commitment to balancing the interests
of the State and accused that arose eighteen years ago in Malloy.
74. See notes 46-57 and accompanying text supra. Significantly, Justice Stewart dis-
trusted a harmless violation of the Constitution. In Chapman he said, "The rule of automatic
reversal would seem best calculated to prevent clear violations of [Grifin]." 386 U.S. at 45.
Moreover, Justice Stewart explicitly delayed consideration of the harmless error doctrine in
Carter. 101 S. Ct. at 1121.
75. See notes 59-69 and accompanying text supra.
76. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist favored local determination of state
criminal procedure. Furthermore, he said that "the Court's decision allow[ed] a criminal de-
fendant in a state proceeding virtually to take from the trial judge any control over the instruc-
tions .. " 101 S. Ct. at 1124.
77. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra
[Casenote by Robert J. Hobaugh, Jr.]
